State v. Lee, 217 So.3d 1266 (La. Ct. App. 2017)

In a 2008 case reviewed by the court State v. Williams (974 So.2d 157), the La. Court emphasized the expert’s documentation of process (what was lacking in the Simmons & Jones case), “the reliability of [the expert’s testimony] is established by the documentation of the process he used to reach his conclusion. . . . The photo shows dozens of striations on both projectiles, and those striations are identical across the groove in the projectiles cut by the rifling in the barrel. Nothing in our review of the testimony and our visual comparison of the photographs of the two projectiles suggests [abuse of discretion].”

 

 

 

“To the contrary, even after publication of the NAS Report, courts have addressed, in detail, the reliability of such testimony and ruled it admissible, although to varying degrees of specificity.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

United States v. O’Driscoll, 2003 WL 1402040 (M.D.Pa. 2003)

Court does not analyze the expert’s testimony. The court simply states that his testimony was sufficient to show that the field was reliable. There is no detail about what the expert’s testimony included.

 

 

 

Quoting U.S. v. Santiago, 199 F.Supp.2d 101: “The Court has not conducted a survey, but it can only imagine the number of convictions that have been based, in part, on expert testimony regarding the match of a particular bullet to a gun seized from a defendant or his apartment. It is the Court’s view that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire, did not call this entire field of expert analysis into question. It is extremely unlikely that a juror would have the same experience and ability to match two or more microscopic images of bullets. In fact, in one recent opinion, the Supreme Court used the example of expert testimony on ballistics to provide a contrast to the marginal utility of polygraph evidence. The Court stated “unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

State v. Couch, 111 S.W.2d 147 (Missouri 1937)

The witness did testify that he was not a ballistic expert, but that he had had much experience in the work of identifying firearms; that the term “ballistic expert” did not apply to his line of work. In this the witness may be technically correct. But, be that as it may, the witness’ testimony disclosed that he was an expert in the identification of firearms and bullets by the comparison method by means of a microscope. The method used in this case to identify the shells and revolvers was similar to the method employed in the case of State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.W. 2d 74, loc. cit. 80. The question was there fully considered and it was held that the witness was qualified to testify. The rule is now well settled that such evidence is competent and may be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

State v. Powells, 2014 WL 5835796 (Ct. App. Wis. 2014)

On the defendants Daubert complaints: “While Powells makes multiple complaints about Simonson’s testimony that might have some significance under the Daubert standard, such as Simonson’s level of education and professional certification, those complaints have no such heft here. In fact, in Jones—another case on which Powells relies-the defendant sought “a blanket rule barring as a matter of course all testimony purporting to tie cartridge cases and bullets to a particular gun … [citing] a number of articles and trial-level decisions questioning the efficacy of such evidence.” See id., 329 Wis.2d 498, ¶ 20, 791 N.W.2d 390. We refused to impose such a rule in light of our then-status as a non-Daubert state. Jones, 329 Wis.2d 498, ¶¶ 21–23, 791 N.W.2d 390.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

State v. Hackett, 55 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 1949)

Very detailed description by the expert of his methods with a few interesting quotes about firearms identification, but the anlaysis was focused on the use of circumstantial evidence, not on the firearms testimony.

 

 

 

“It is now common knowledge that by means of the science of ballistics, it may often be determined that a bullet was fired from a certain pistol, and it is the modern tendency of our courts to allow the introduction of expert testimony to show that the bullet which killed the deceased was fired from a particular pistol or rifle, where it is first definitely shown that the witness by whom such testimony is offered is, by experience and training, qualified to give an expert opinion in the field of ballistics. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 565, page 876; 26 Am.Jur., § 440, page 460. The weight of such testimony is for the determination of the jury.”

 

Quote from expert: “‘It has found by scientific tests that it is not possible for two weapons to exist that impart the same pattern of microscopic markings. It is similar in this respect to finger printing examination where it has not yet been found that any two persons have identical finger prints. The same is true of weapons, each leaves its own identifying marks characteristic to that weapon alone and no other weapon can impart similar markings.’”