In this case, Sergeant Willson was a properly qualified expert whose testimony helped the jury understand a matter beyond the knowledge or experience of most lay people, and he employed a widely-accepted and accurate test in doing so. He was properly admitted under Ohio Evid.R. 702, and his comparison testing is a generally accepted method of forensic analysis. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony or in allowing Willson to testify.
compare this case with Willock
focuses on whether toolmark identification as a whole is unreliable, not in this specific instance.
Footnote describing defendant’s objection to expert’s qualificaitons: “Specifically, Harrell complained that Anderson “has not attained a college degree in science,” is not a member of any professional organization, and had not taken any proficiency tests at the time he performed the ballistics tests in issue. Aside from the fact that Harrell has not established that any of Anderson’s “deficiencies” are actual requirements, Anderson testified that he had trained for three years in an apprenticeship-type program with a forensic tool mark examiner who had thirty years’ experience.”
” Further, though Harrell thinks that Anderson’s testimony should be excluded because Harrell believes current literature indicates there is no such thing as a “perfect match” between bullets and a particular gun, we note that the third case on which Harrell relies, Jones, addressed exactly that question. Jones sought “a blanket rule barring as a matter of course all testimony purporting to tie cartridge cases and bullets to a particular gun … [citing] a number of articles and trial-level decisions questioning the efficacy of such evidence.” . . . We refused to impose such a rule in light of our then-status as a non-Daubert state. . . . Accordingly, the circuit court could properly conclude it would not have granted any attempt by trial counsel to exclude Anderson’s testimony, because there was no basis on which the court should have done so.”
Court just held generally that this satisfies 702, but does not make a ruling on any specific part of 702.
“After a review of Defendants’ arguments, the NAS Report, and the relevant case law, the Court concludes that firearm and toolmark identification is sufficiently reliable for admission under Rule 702. Numerous courts across the country have conducted thorough analyses of the reliability of toolmark identification with firearms in light of the NAS Report. It appears that in every instance, the court determined that expert testimony on toolmark analysis was admissible. . . . Indeed, Woods has not cited a single case excluding this type of expert testimony.”
However, because the process relies to some degree on each examiner’s experience, expertise, and subjective analysis, the Court concludes, as have numerous other courts, that any ballistics expert may not testify that (1) he/she is “certain” or “100% sure” that two items match, (2) a match is to “the exclusion of all other firearms in the world,” or (3) there is a “practical impossibility” that any other gun could have fired the recovered materials. A firearms expert may only testify that, in his or her expert opinion, the bullet came from the suspect firearm to within a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination field. At trial, Defendants are, of course, entitled to introduce testimony that refutes the testimony of the Government’s expert(s) conclusions, to the extent allowed by the district judge presiding over their trial.