Covering the Basic Concepts Surrounding the Weight and Strength of Evidence

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Outline

▶ Introduction
▶ Timeline of Events
▶ Conclusion of Part 1
▶ Recent Developments
▶ Controversies
▶ Conclusion of Part 2
Recent Developments

- Formalized structure for dealing with 2 common questions
  - Common source vs. Specific source frameworks
  - Explicit incorporation of evidence/data from relevant background population
  - More details can be found in the 2018 LPR paper\(^1\)

- Exploration of rigorous VoE approximations
  - Relationship between BF and LR
  - Bernstein-von Mises approximation to the BF
  - Neyman-Pearson approximation to the LR
Motivating Example

**FBI Copper Wire**

- An improvised explosive device(s) (IED) is found.
- Can the copper wire in the two different IEDs be attributed to the same source?
- A roll of copper wire is found at a suspect’s garage.
- Is the copper wire used in the IED indistinguishable from the wire found at the suspect’s garage?
Motivating Example

At different points of this scenario, there are two different questions that are asked:

**Q1:** Are the copper wire samples found at the crime scene from the same wire coil found on the suspect?

**Q2:** Are the copper wire samples found at these two different crime scenes from the same wire coil?
Motivating Example

What is the difference between these two questions?

Q1: The source (the wire coil related to the suspect) is fixed!

Q2: There is not a specific source in mind– we are only concerned with whether or not the two samples share a common (but unknown) source.
Q1: Are the copper wire samples found at the crime scene from the same wire coil found on the suspect?

Forensic Evidence

\[ e_n = \{e_s, e_a, e_u\} \]

- **e_s**: The \( n_s \) control samples from the fixed specific source.
- **e_a**: The samples from the \( n_a \) sources in the alternative source population.
- **e_u**: The recovered samples with unknown source.
Q1: Are the copper wire samples found at the crime scene from the same wire coil found on the suspect?

Forensic Hypotheses

\( H_p \): The recovered and control samples both originate from the fixed specific source.

\( H_d \): The recovered samples originate from some other source in the alternative source population.
Identification of Common Source

**Q2:** Are the copper wire samples found at these two different crime scenes from the same wire coil?

**Forensic Evidence**

\[ e_n = \{ e_a, e_{u1}, e_{u2} \} \]

- \( e_a \): The samples from the \( n_a \) sources in the alternative source population.
- \( e_{u1} \): The first set of recovered samples with unknown source.
- \( e_{u2} \): The second set of recovered samples with unknown source.
**Q2:** Are the copper wire samples found at these two different crime scenes from the same wire coil?

**Forensic Hypotheses**

- $H_p$: Both sets of recovered samples originate from the same source in the alternative source population.

- $H_d$: The two sets of recovered samples originate from two different sources in the alternative source population.
The Bayes Factor

**General Form**

\[ V_{BF}(e) = \frac{\int f(e|\theta_p, M_p) \, d\Pi(\theta_p)}{\int f(e|\theta_d, M_d) \, d\Pi(\theta_d)} \]

**Common Source**

\[ BF_{cs}(e) = \frac{\int f(e_{u1}, e_{u2}|\theta_a, M_p) \, d\Pi(\theta_a|e_a)}{\int f(e_{u1}|\theta_a, M_d)f(e_{u2}|\theta_a, M_d) \, d\Pi(\theta_a|e_a)} \]

**Specific Source**

\[ BF_{ss}(e) = \frac{\int f(e_u|\theta_s) \, d\Pi(\theta_s|e_s)}{\int f(e_u|\theta_a) \, d\Pi(\theta_a|e_a)} \]
The Likelihood Ratio Function

Likelihood Ratio Function

\[ V_{LR}(\theta; e_u) = \frac{f(e_u|\theta, M_p)}{f(e_u|\theta, M_d)} \]

Common Source

\[ LR_{cs}(\theta_a; e_u) = \frac{f(e_{u1}, e_{u2}|\theta_a, M_p)}{f(e_{u1}|\theta_a, M_d)f(e_{u2}|\theta_a, M_d)} \]

Specific Source

\[ LR_{ss}(\theta; e_u) = \frac{f(e_u|\theta_s, M_p)}{f(e_u|\theta_a, M_d)} \]
The Likelihood Ratio

**True Likelihood Ratio**

\[ V_{LR}(\theta_0; e_u) = \frac{f(e_u|\theta_0, M_p)}{f(e_u|\theta_0, M_d)} \]

**Common Source**

\[ LR_{cs}(\theta_a; e_u) = \frac{f(e_{u_1}, e_{u_2}|\theta_a, M_p)}{f(e_{u_1}|\theta_a, M_d)f(e_{u_2}|\theta_a, M_d)} \]

**Specific Source**

\[ LR_{ss}(\theta_0; e_u) = \frac{f(e_u|\theta_s, M_p)}{f(e_u|\theta_a, M_d)} \]
Comparing the $BF$ and the $LR$

- The $BF$ is a single number which contains in it all measures of uncertainty
- The true $LR$ has no uncertainty
- Can often think of the $BF$ as an integrated $LR$ with respect to a special posterior

\[
V_{BF}(e) = \int V_{LR}(\theta; e_u) \ d\Pi(\theta|e, M_d)
\]

- They are both nearly impossible to obtain in real life!!
Comparing the $BF$ and the $LR$

Theorem (1)$^1$

**Assumptions:**

- Fixed observation of $e_u$
- Suitable conditions on $V_{LR}(\theta; e_u)$ and $\hat{\theta}_n|_{M_d}$
- Assumptions of Bernstein-von Mises Theorem$^2$ hold

**Result:** The sequence of Bayes Factors converges in $P^n_\theta$-probability to the true likelihood ratio as $n \to \infty$,

\[ V_{BF}(e_n) \overset{P^n_\theta}{\to} V_{LR}(\theta_0; e_u). \]

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$^1$See the current arXiv paper$^2$ for details.

$^2$Theorem 10.1 from van der Vaart$^3$
The goal is to find an approximation of the value of evidence, $\tilde{V}$, which will lead to an *approximately admissible decision rule* \[4\]

\[
\frac{P(H_p|e, I)}{P(H_d|e, I)} = \left[ \tilde{V} \times \frac{P(H_p|I)}{P(H_d|I)} \right] + o_{P_{\theta_0}}(1).
\]

Two approximations will be considered:

1. Bernstein-von Mises Approximation
2. Neyman-Pearson Approximation
Approximate a posterior distribution with a Normal centered at MLE with variance of inverse observed Fisher Information Matrix

\[ \hat{\theta}_d \] is the MLE for \( \theta \) under \( M_d \) using the data \( e_n \)

\[ I_{n_d}^{-1}(\hat{\theta}_d) \] is the observed Fisher’s information matrix for \( e_n \) at \( \hat{\theta}_d \) under \( M_d \)

\[ V_{BVM}(e_n) = \int V_{LR}(\theta; e_u) \ dN(\hat{\theta}_d, I_{n_d}^{-1}(\hat{\theta}_d)) \]
Bernstein-von Mises Approximation

- **Specific Source**

  \[
  BVM_{ss}(e_n) = \int LR_{ss}(\theta; e_u) \ dN(\hat{\theta}_d, I_n^{-1}(\hat{\theta}_d))
  \]

- **Common Source**

  \[
  BVM_{cs}(e_n) = \int LR_{cs}(\theta_a; e_u) \ dN(\hat{\theta}_a^d, I_n^{-1}(\hat{\theta}_a^d))
  \]
Theorem (2)

**Assumptions:**
- Fixed observation of $e_u$
- Suitable conditions on $V_{LR}(\theta; e_u)$ and $\hat{\theta}_n|_{M_d}$
- Assumptions of Bernstein-von Mises Theorem$^3$ hold

**Result:**

$$\left| V_{BVM}(e_n) - V_{BF}(e_n) \right| \overset{P^n_{\theta}}{\to} 0, \quad n \to \infty$$

$^3$Theorem 10.1 from van der Vaart$^[3]$
The Neyman-Pearson Approximation

- Estimate unknown parameters with MLEs under each model independently
- Let $\Theta_p$ and $\Theta_d$ represent the restricted parameter spaces under $M_p$ and $M_d$, respectively

$$V_{NP}(e_n) = \frac{\max_{\theta_p \in \Theta_p} f(e_n | \theta_p)}{\max_{\theta_d \in \Theta_d} f(e_n | \theta_d)}.$$
Neyman-Pearson Approximation

**Specific Source**

\[ NP_{ss}(e_n) = \frac{f(e_s|\hat{\theta}_s^*)f(e_u|\hat{\theta}_s^*)f(e_a|\hat{\theta}_a)}{f(e_s|\hat{\theta}_s)f(e_u|\hat{\theta}_a^*)f(e_a|\hat{\theta}_a^*)} \]

- \( \hat{\theta}_s^* \) and \( \hat{\theta}_a \) are the MLEs of \( \theta_s \) and \( \theta_a \) under \( M_p \)
- \( \hat{\theta}_s \) and \( \hat{\theta}_a^* \) are the MLEs of \( \theta_s \) and \( \theta_a \) under \( M_d \)

**Common Source**

\[ NP_{cs}(e_n) = \frac{f(e_{u1}, e_{u2}|\hat{\theta}_a^p, M_p)f(e_a|\hat{\theta}_a^p)}{f(e_{u1}|\hat{\theta}_a^d, M_d)f(e_{u2}|\hat{\theta}_a^d, M_d)f(e_a|\hat{\theta}_a^d)} \]

- \( \hat{\theta}_a^p \) is the MLE of \( \theta_a \) under \( M_p \)
- \( \hat{\theta}_a^d \) is the MLE of \( \theta_a \) under \( M_d \)
Neyman-Pearson Approximation

Theorem (3)

**Assumptions:**
- Fixed observation of $e_u$
- Likelihood functions are bounded, continuous
- Assumptions of the Consistency of M-Estimators theorem\textsuperscript{4} hold
- Assumptions of the Linearization of M-Estimators theorem\textsuperscript{5} hold

**Result:**

$$V_{NP}(e_n) \xrightarrow{P_{\theta}} V_{LR}(\theta_0; e_u), \quad n \to \infty$$

\textsuperscript{4}Corollary 3.2.3 on p. 287 from van der Vaart and Wellner\textsuperscript{[5]}
\textsuperscript{5}Theorem 3.3.1 on p. 310 from van der Vaart and Wellner\textsuperscript{[5]}
Corollary (3.1)

Suppose that the likelihood ratio function is bounded in $P_{\theta_0}$-probability in a neighborhood of $\theta_0$. The Neyman-Pearson approximation is an approximate value of evidence for the forensic identification of source problems:

$$\frac{P(H_p|e, I)}{P(H_d|e, I)} = \left[ V_{NP}(e_n) \times \frac{P(H_p|I)}{P(H_d|I)} \right] + o_{P_{\theta_0}}(1).$$
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Controversies

- Quantifying uncertainty in Likelihood Ratios
- PCAST and commentary
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Round 1: Law, Probability, and Risk
- Dismissal of the Illusion of Uncertainty in the Assessment of a LR [14]
- Uncertainty and LR: to integrate or not to integrate, that’s the question [15]
- Comment from a practitioner’s point of view [16]
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Dismissal of the Illusion of Uncertainty ...

- “probabilities are not states of nature, but states of mind”
- it only makes sense to estimate a state of nature
- “probability is given by a single number” (it’s not logical to have two different numbers)
- “nothing will be gained if a particular expression for uncertainty, in terms of a probability, is itself obscured or blurred by an additional level of uncertainty.”

**Conclusion:** “for a particular case, forensic scientists ought to offer to the court a single value for the BF, rather than a range of values.”
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

... To integrate or not to integrate ...

- If you choose to present a Bayes Factor then there is no disagreement

- If you choose to present a “plug-in” likelihood ratio based on available data, then it seems reasonable to attach uncertainty to that estimate in the form of a credible interval

- Outside of the fully Bayesian approach, “estimating” the likelihood ratio makes sense

- **Conclusion:** It is more informative to the courts to present a “plug-in LR” with corresponding uncertainty quantification
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Comment from a practitioner’s point of view

- There is a gap between the sophistication of methods statisticians propose and the statistical knowledge of a forensic practitioner

- “There is obviously some kind of clash here between quality assurance and probabilistic reasoning.”

- Conclusion: “I think we should admit that at a beginning stage it is better that a forensic expert reports a range of likelihood ratios than that she returns to the classical way of expressing posterior probabilities by using vague verbal expressions.”
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Round 2: Science and Justice

- Virtual Special Issue on Measuring and Reporting the Precision of Forensic Likelihood Ratios [17]
- 7 position papers [18–24]
- 3 response papers [25–28]
- 3 reply papers [29–31]
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Round 3:

▶ Oct 12, 2017 Press Release:

*NIST Experts Urge Caution in Use of Courtroom Evidence Presentation Method: Use of 'Likelihood Ratio’ not consistently supported by scientific reasoning approach, authors state.*

▶ Authors: Steven Lund and Hari Iyer

▶ Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look [32]

▶ Responses: 4
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Lund & Iyer

- There has been a lot of talk about BF & LR ... Should we even be using them in court?
- “We find the likelihood ratio paradigm to be unsupported by arguments of Bayesian decision theory”
- “Nevertheless, a likelihood ratio may be viewed as a potential tool for experts in their communications to triers of fact.”
- **Conclusion:** “We propose the concept of a lattice of assumptions leading to an uncertainty pyramid as a framework for assessing the uncertainty in an evaluation of a likelihood ratio.”
Debates about Quantifying Uncertainty

Responses

▶ “We conclude that L&I argue against a practice that does not exist and which no one advocates.” [33]

▶ Provides suggestions for how to properly use BF in court [34]

▶ Reviews an argument (originally discussed by IJ Good) that the BF/LR “is the only logically admissible form of evaluation.” [35]

▶ “A press release from NIST could potentially impede progress toward improving the analysis of forensic evidence and the presentation of forensic analysis results in courts in the US and around the world.” [36]
Which evidence interpretation paradigm to use?

- Many interpreted the PCAST report\textsuperscript{[37]} as advocating the use of the Two-Stage Approach
- Responses: 2
  - Both advocate use of the Bayesian (Likelihood Ratio) paradigm
  - Letter to Editor in FSI by Morrison et al.\textsuperscript{[38]}
  - Commentary in FSI by Evett, Berger, Buckleton, Champod, and Jackson\textsuperscript{[39]}
Introduction
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Conclusion

Thank you!

- There has been a LOT of progress towards better ways of finding the value of evidence
- This progress has sparked a lot of controversy as researchers move in “opposing” directions
- There’s still a lot of work to be done
- We should attempt to reconcile the arguments if we have any hope for change in practice
Too many to list in this one slide ...

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